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There is an increasingly vociferous debate about whether population growth is 
relevant to climate mitigation policy. The production of scientific knowledge about 
this relationship, its use in policy and public arenas, and its interpretation by 
numerous third parties thereafter present a political and ethical conundrum in 
which normative values are easily hidden.  Rather than assess the evidence for the 
contribution population growth might make to future greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHG), and the implicit or explicit population policy implications therein, this 
paper engages with a sociological analysis of the process of knowledge production 
to reveal why the controversy persists. This paper seeks to equip policy makers 
with a theoretical framework through which to navigate such values and thus 




There is an increasingly vociferous debate about whether population growth 
is relevant to climate mitigation policy. Proponents offer evidence both for1,2,3 and 
against4,5 the claim that current rates of population growth will make emissions 
abatement harder to achieve. The voices from either side of the debate are related to 
the well-trodden ground of Malthusian theory, around which each camp seems to be 
recasting their boundary lines. 
 
In considering the evidence for and against the role of population growth in 
aggravating greenhouse gas (GHG) emission rates and the policy implications 
therein, it is helpful to critically engage with the processes of science and “knowledge 
production.” Such engagement can expose what is “concealed in the natural 
discourse of science” and how it is concealed in order to better understand why the 
controversy persists.6 This paper distinguishes between science produced upstream 
and downstream. Upstream science is commonly understood to be produced in the 
laboratory or field and to originate from a “pure science environment” which is 
perceived as apolitical. Downstream science is more explicitly related to a policy 
environment. The normative assumptions underlying not only scientific claims made 
upstream, but also importantly the use of those claims downstream by policy actors 
and politically situated advocates, will determine the nature of the debate. The links 
                                                 




between demographic change and climatic change are complex, varied, and 
uncertain. Population growth, in addition to demographic dynamics like migration, 
age structure and household size, may or may not be relevant to global 
environmental change. For the purposes of this paper I have narrowed the 
discussion to the link between a single demographic variable- population growth and 
its causal relationship to climate change. Sequitur to this claim are the implicit or 
explicit policy repercussions around the perceived value of family planning as a 
means to lower fertility rates and slow population growth. 
 
The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) works well in conditions of 
controversy, particularly where it is possible to distinguish the agency of the scientist 
from that of the social scientist and where there is public policy at stake.19 
The controversy over whether population growth is linearly connected to increasing 
GHG emissions is therefore an apt dispute through which sociological approaches to 
scientific knowledge can be explored. This is especially true given that acceptance of 
this scientific claim would likely justify policy that seeks to slow global population 
growth rates. 
 
Efforts to include population issues into the climate change policy dialogue 
are complicated by the uneven global distribution of energy consumption and GHG 
emissions. This underpins the politicization of scientific knowledge produced on the 
relationship between population and climate change. The linear and causal role of 
population growth in GHG emissions is contested because the countries that have 
the highest per capita emissions often have relatively slow population growth or 
population stabilization. The largest growth in population, however, occurs in the 
some of the world‟s poorest countries, which contribute a tiny per capita fraction of 
the GHG emissions of a rich industrialised economy. Therefore the production of 
scientific knowledge about this relationship, its use in policy and public arenas and 
interpretation by numerous third parties thereafter presents a political and ethical 
conundrum in which normative values are, consciously or not, easily hidden.  
 
The controversy about population and climate change makes for an 
appropriate focus of analysis not least because it stems from a much longer history 
of polarized opinion and debate over the relevance for and impact of global 
population growth, but also because of its highly political nature and growing 
visibility in public and policy discourse. Testament to its position amongst political 
and public priorities is its appearance in the United Nations “State of the World 
Population” Report: Climate Change, Women and Population in November 2009, as 
a subject that was discussed at the Cop15 climate change conference in Copenhagen 
in 2009, and a topic with increasingly frequent media coverage. 
 
The primary section of this paper will illustrate the broader context in which 
this debate is framed. The subsequent sections explore sociological approaches to 
the analysis of scientific discourse to assess Wynne‟s claim that “normative 
assumptions are concealed in the natural discourse of science.”6 I have divided the 
knowledge production or research sites into two categories: upstream and 
downstream.6 Using as an upstream research site I will examine the work of earth 
scientist Brian O‟Neill who has completed projections to 2100 as evidence linking 
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population and climate change. Sequitur to upstream analysis I have bracketed the 
work of two key actors with diametrically opposed positions claiming naturalized 
scientific knowledge. Sociological analysis of these actors‟ positions may expose 
certain underlying cognitive social constructs. I consider the policy papers from a 
Washington based non-governmental organization (NGO) in support of making a 
causal link between population growth and GHG emissions – Population Action 
International (PAI). In opposition to the claim that population growth is a driver of 
climate change is the paper “The implications of population growth and urbanization 
for climate change,” published in the journal Urbanization and Environment in 2009 by 
David Satterthwaite.5 Satterthwaite represents the London based think tank 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). Henceforth both 
parties will be referenced as PAI and Satterthwaite. 
 
It is necessary to draw a distinction between upstream and downstream 
science because of a divergence in the strategies employed in the way knowledge is 
constructed at both sites. It also highlights the important nexus in the science-policy 
interface. Knowledge produced within a “pure” science environment upstream, 
which is perceived as apolitical, in fact employs certain strategies to both maintain 
authority and simultaneously engage with policy.  Downstream knowledge 
production that is more explicitly related to a policy environment also proves a 
critical point for research. My analysis of downstream science shows that it will 
appropriate, reproduce or distort upstream science for its own political ends. 
 
This paper supports the notion that to differing degrees, and through varied 
strategies, the knowledge produced both upstream and downstream is a hybrid of 
both social and scientific considerations in line with the realist constructivist school 
of thinking.7 The prospect of such acknowledges the presence of political and value 
based inputs affecting research outcomes that claim authority in explaining the 
natural world. In the context of contentious issues, with clear opposing sides to the 
debate, combatants “have frequently asserted that science compels their favorable 
political perspective.”8 With consensus that science is an outcome of complex social 
process, at least amongst those that study the issue sociologically, the question is how 
exactly can science construction be characterized and explained? 
 
However, the question addressed here is less about whether non-science 
makes its way into scientific claims, since this is apparent by the nature and 
persistence of controversy and deliberation. Rather, the central question is how the 
policy bind may be navigated in the context of multiple policy options, uncertainty 
and contestation. The debate about population and climate change appears as a 
deadlock until we recognize the driving values underpinning each opponent‟s 
reasoning. Such acknowledgement would help policy makers and donors steer 
through these values to arrive at outcomes which are balanced and well informed†. 
                                                 
†
 My analysis stems from the experience of working in an advocacy environment for two years 
principally developing messages that directly support the connection between global population 
growth and climate change. I argue that presently I am adequately distant to maintain a good sense 
of neutrality, though, as is the case with making scientific claims, in the case of this paper 





2. Population Policy in the 21st: context of the debate 
 
Population trends today are a highly contested issue that crop up in a range 
of related debates: climate change, development, environmental sustainability, and in 
the case of the advanced industrial nations in Europe and Japan, aging. While many 
in the field are familiar with the history of global population policy, few working 
outside of it know of the critical paradigm shift that underpinned the rags to riches 
story of family planning services in global development resourcing. At a pivotal 
period in the aftermath of the International Conference for Population and 
Development in Cairo in 1994, family planning services and budgets were assimilated 
into the broader framework of reproductive health, emphasizing overall health and 
reproductive wellbeing. Yet family planning services and commodity resourcing as a 
proportion of total population expenditure globally has dropped by more than 30% 
in real terms over the past ten years.3 In addition to a conservative political 
environment and other religious and cultural resistance, family planning commodities 
were cut back in favor of alternative donor causes of the day like HIV/AIDS. Thus 
advocacy groups like Population Action International, though concerned with 
broader goals of reproductive health, privilege family planning amongst advocacy 
efforts that utilize the population paradigm. 
 
The question is hence whether the ascendency of climate research has 
presented a golden opportunity for family planning advocates to refocus and 
leverage policy priorities around the magnetism and omnipotent draw of climate 
change discourse. While recognizing this might be the case, supporters persist with 
the rationale that in a context of fierce competition for scarce development resources 
it would make sense to invest in those that offer multiple long and short term 
benefits, which, it is argued, family planning does.1,2,9 
 
2. Upstream Science 
 
In order to appreciate the normative aspects behind the truth claims of the 
population-climate debate we must move upstream to the point of knowledge 
production within the science research community. As a primary point of analysis I 
use as a research site earth scientist Brian O‟Neill, and the book he authored with 
colleagues at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 
“Population and Climate Change.”2 O‟Neill‟s work and its authoritative nature have 
great relevance for knowledge producers and users downstream amongst NGOs and 
policy makers. O‟Neill‟s modification of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change‟s (IPCC 2000) population and greenhouse gas emission projections until 
2100 using sensitivity testing is the only work of its kind, at least in terms of 
methodological scope and rigor. 
Ravetz (1973) introduced the notion of “regulatory science” which is 
different from academic science, since it is made useful for policy makers rather than 
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academics.10 Chubin and Restivo (1983) propose that experts will adapt their 
messages according to their specific audiences; for example whether they are 
speaking or writing for a specialized professional audience or an open public one.7 
This is an apt methodological framework to apply to the work of Brian O‟Neill. 
O‟Neill writes for both academic and policy audiences and also speaks at a range of 
events, which are invariably hosted by policy orientated organizations. The difference 
in this case is O‟Neill‟s willingness to engage in policy recommendations, based upon 
both the demands of the scientific world and the policy world. In the year 2000 work 
“Population and Climate Change” he asserts, “Whether one would wish to select 
policies that affect population from a menu of choices is a question we are not yet 
prepared to answer.”2 Yet stresses an alternative position in writing a “view point” 
for the journal Global Environmental Change:  “…slower population growth would 
make climate problem easier to solve, and capturing these long term benefits requires 
investments in population policies in the immediate future.”2 
 
This is not to necessarily criticize O‟Neill‟s oscillation. As Irwin et al. noted, 
“Science in meeting the demands of policy has to transgress its own cognitive 
boundaries”, that is, it has to make “predictions in the face of uncertainties”11 The 
world of policy looks to experts to participate. Arguably in this case O‟Neill is best 
qualified to do so because he is adept at acknowledging uncertainty and complexity: 
“While we arrive at this conclusion based on a very simple model: a number of ad 
hoc calculations suggest the result is probably robust…”2 
 
The elegant logic of win/ win principles found in the reasoning O‟Neill 
offers, where family planning is a low cost yet underfunded intervention offering 
multiple benefits for development indicators in the short run and climate mitigation, 
in the long run is perhaps too tempting to resist. O‟Neill however takes care to 
emphasize that “while analyses have shown that slower population growth can 
substantially reduce emissions in the long run, they have also concluded that it is no 
panacea.”2 Thus, O‟Neill reinforces his authority to make policy claims with the best 
possible knowledge available of the complex broader picture.  
 
Whether reassuring or disturbing, it is important to appreciate the extent to 
which statistical projections based on regression analyses such as O‟Neill‟s have 
already departed from the strict Mertonian norms or unquestioningly reliable 
“normal” science Khun outlined. “Inherent limitations” exist “in principle of that 
knowledge, however competently produced.”6 Funtowicz and Ravitz (1993) in their 
discussion of methodological shortcomings of regressions reference Bailar, stating, 
“…random variability- the stuff of p-values and confidence limits, is simply 
swamped by other kinds of uncertainties…”12 
 
Challenges to the authority of statistical certainty are not un-documented: 
Leamer (1983) cites, Black (1982), Pratt and Schlaifer (1979) and Sims (1982).13 The 
question hence is how to manage this uncertainty?6 When uncertainty is apparent, 
there is a necessity for a more discursive, democratic kind of knowledge creation to 
take root, where uncertainty is acknowledged and diversity is embraced.12 O‟Neill 
manages this concept well by proposing that population considerations simply 




that would have a much more direct and urgent impact such as addressing energy 
use. The trouble lies in the way this knowledge may be used in more politicized 
environments further downstream. 
 
3. Downstream: Knowledge Production and Use 
 
At the upstream end of this science debate, controversy does not emerge as a 
particularly pertinent issue. As mentioned, O‟Neill‟s work has not yet been subjected 
to a rigorous counter study, and therefore remains uncontested by a similar 
methodological analysis claiming alternative conclusions. The point of controversy is 
located further downstream of the scientific community in the protracted debate 
amongst policy advisors in NGOs, in this case that of PAI and Satterthwaite.1,5 I turn 
now to analysis of both sides in this debate to expose where each is influenced by 
framing assumptions and the strategies employed to conceal a hybrid of both 
scientific and normative values. 
 
Sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) requires analysts to subject both 
sides of the controversy to the “same repertoire of conceptual tools” in a process of 
symmetry.14 Chubin and Restivo (1983), as the earliest protagonists of the realist- 
constructivist approach, describe “…deep seated, emotionally held beliefs about the 
social world and human behaviour- that researchers bring to bear in the 
interpretation of data, it should be instructive to observe what is claimed by whom, 
and to what apparent end…”7 
 
Using the realist constructivist epistemology, which sees science as a hybrid 
between scientific and social processes, as a guiding framework, I restrict my analysis 
to three processes.7 These are: 
 
1.  Were priorities set? What are the dominant narratives?  
2.  Which methodology was accepted? Were inputs selective? Which 
data was revealed and which concealed? 
3.  Which policies were endorsed and which rejected and why? 
 
3.1. Priorities and dominant narratives 
 
Population Action International is existentially bound to arguing that global 
population growth should be taken seriously by policy makers. Even apart from this 
specific issue, the value of advocacy or pressure groups should be questioned, with 
the prospect for distorted or exaggerated messages. Policy process analysts call 
attention to the philosophical and historical roots that form the basis of different 
narratives, which would explain why some “stick.”15 The problem framing in this 
instance is related to high fertility†, but the problem is in fact more complex. This 
narrative incorporates numerous ancillary aspects and has evolved according to 
paradigm shifts like that which occurred after the Cairo Programme of Action, which 
                                                 
† The UN defines high fertility as a total fertility rate above 4.5 children per woman. 
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introduced the concept of human rights as primary rationale for family planning 
provisions. PAI exist to do what they do – provide family planning and reproductive 
health services. Problem framing in respect to this topic will unavoidably privilege 
these priorities over others unrelated to their work.  The problem framing in this 
instance fits neatly with the policy options embedded in the institutional capacity of 
donor agencies, NGOs, and public health departments. Commentators argue family 
planning provision is tried and tested, and thus policy options must overcome 
barriers and scale up resources to fund these provisions.16 
 
In opposition, Satterthwaite considers the standpoint of Betsy Hartman 
(1998).10 He draws from her the notion that “the implications of population growth 
and urbanization for climate change” is to maintain a focus on the gross disparities 
of consumption patterns around the world, which an emphasis on population 
growth and aggregate human numbers can serve to dilute.10 A simplistic focus on 
population in the climate change debate can be highly depoliticizing that both 
persecutes and demonizes those that bear least responsibility, namely the millions 
across the developing world living in zones of high population growth and 
widespread energy poverty. Thus, evidence in this case, must be assembled and 
published as a counter narrative to the popular Malthusian reasoning, which posits 
that aggregate human numbers denude and pilfer natural resources faster than they 
can be replenished. Malthus famously predicted in the 17th century that current rates 
of population growth would lead to widespread war and famine because food 
production would not keep up. He was subsequently disproved because of advances 
in technology that led to the green revolution. Nevertheless the same principle is 
popularly drawn upon in a range of environmental debates, and can easily gain 
momentum as what Keely and Scoones (2005) propose is an entrenched policy meta-
narrative.17 
 
3.2. Which methodology, inputs and data? 
 
Methodological comparisons between the two papers are more elusive than 
identifying   competing priorities. PAI‟s data is more or less drawn directly from the 
studies O‟Neill and colleagues completed on the topic. Indeed, it is naturalized to the 
extent that the co-author of PAI paper is in fact one of such colleagues. At the time 
of writing Leiwen Jiang, a colleague of O‟Neill‟s, was temporarily stationed in a 
senior advisory position at PAI. Such recruitment of expertise exposes another 
important way in which knowledge may be legitimized. 
 
Satterthwaite does not make reference to O‟Neill‟s study directly, but only 
indirectly through referencing PAI. Instead, Satterthwaite draws together new 
quantitative evidence to support the counter argument, though not without some 
serious methodological flaws. Difficulties admittedly lie with all econometric 
regressions and statistical analyses,12,13 given that parameters are set and variables, 
with differing degrees of uncertainty, are chosen by the analyst. Social externalities 
can find their way into the most highly regarded statistical models, such as the IPCC 
climate projection.18 Nevertheless, Satterthwaite draws together data, using a 




Furthermore, he draws simplistic inferences between associated variables, which, 
despite any apparent misgivings in regression analysis, is a highly questionable way of 
either proving or disproving causality. Satterthwaite employs a strategy that 
deliberately misuses time shown in the following extract: 
 
“A review of carbon dioxide emissions (CO2) emissions levels for nations, 
and how they changed between 1980 ad 2005 (and also between 1950 and 
1980) shows little association between nations with rapid population growth; 
indeed it is mostly nations with very low emissions per person (and often 
only slowly growing emissions) that have the highest population growth 
rates.”5 
 
PAI, referencing evidence from O‟Neill, use data to consider the relationship 
well into the future – between 1990 and 2100 – and build on the IPCC framework.  
A simple review of past relationships offers little to explain the future in a fast 
changing and dynamic world. A primary point that proponents of the links between 
population and climate change would make is that while population growth alone is 
not enough to aggravate climate change, the places with high rates of growth are also 
forecasted to experience the highest economic and emissions growth rates into the 
21st century. Satterthwaite disregards the relevance of this point for the future change 
in global economic factors based upon “the failure of more than 50 years of 
development,”5 which both consigns hundreds of millions to sustained poverty for 
the next 50 years, and undermines the wider goals of the IIED.  
 
3.3. Which policies are endorsed and which rejected? 
 
Policy disputes are arguably at the heart of the controversy over population 
and climate change. The stakes are high, not only for the funding of a lagging sector, 
but indeed for the human rights and well-being of perhaps hundreds of millions 
across the world. There are risks involved with the implications of PAI‟s messages, 
inherently benign as I believe them to be. Yet overlap does exist between the policy 
recommendations from PAI and Satterthwaite; both endorse high quality, voluntary 
reproductive health supplies including family planning. Both condemn the coercive 
population policies of the past. Satterthwaite however, emphasizes primary 
importance of addressing disproportionately high rates of per capita consumption 
and vitally prioritizing energy policy for those that currently live in “energy poverty.”5 
This is relevant because it focuses on a different emphasis to PAI, and is primarily 
associated with political and social factors of inequality.  
 
While PAI is referenced in the paper‟s bibliography, it is more generally 
alluded to in policy discussion as “…those demanding large reductions in population 
numbers as the only possibility of a „sustainable‟ future…”5 This inadvertently sets 
up a straw man argument. O‟Neill is careful to emphasize the more direct and 
important ways to address GHG emissions through energy policy, but recognizes 
multiplicity of pathways to achieve emission goals and hence the importance of 
population in a long range view. PAI are less careful with downplaying the 
importance of population, and in fact deliberatively talk it up, as I have mentioned 
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they are existentially bound to do. Nevertheless, PAI do not call for “reduced human 
numbers”, but rather the satisfaction of “unmet demand” in family planning to meet 
human rights entitlements, which would aid prevention of unplanned pregnancies.1 
 
The window through which we can reconcile these differences lies in 
recognition of the rationale each side draw on. Hartman, whose work Satterthwaite 
references, asserts that “though yet to be implemented effectively through lack of 
funds and political will, the Cairo consensus has provided renewed legitimacy to neo-
Malthusianism in liberal and progressive circles.”19 Thus Hartman acknowledges the 
lack of political will to adequately fund the Cairo Programme of Action and hence 
exposes in her condemnation the rationale behind the persistent advocacy efforts to 
draw attention to this policy arena. At the heart of this controversy is in fact a 
problem with instrumentalizing the worth of investing in reproductive rights, which 
we can see is instead disguised as a controversy about scientific fact.  
 
This is true in the population-climate debate where both sides underplay the 
importance of the other‟s policy principles and instead advance claims and counter 
claims predicated on “scientific fact.” 
 
4. Competing Ideologies and Policy Deadlock 
 
Responses to and interpretations of Robert Malthus‟ essay in 1784 have a 
long and varied history, embraced by a colorful range of protagonists spanning 
Darwin, Nazi Germany, and eugenicists.20 Satterthwaite draws heavily on the work of 
Hartman, a women‟s rights advocate and vociferously persuasive opponent of 
Malthusianism.5 Hartman‟s work is laced with the emotive language of racism and 
white supremacy, drawing on the most extreme political ideologies to denounce the 
17th century economic theory. Hartman discusses contemporary socio-political 
debates pivoting on Malthusian reasoning in the USA which, it is argued frequently, 
derive from a fear of the “other” reduced to an “us vs. them” narrative where the 
“Global South represents one big destructive force.”19 Arguably, however 
mainstream debates about climate change issues all stem from a basic sense of 
Malthusianism, applicable to anyone in the world that consumes energy, and the 
notion that humans unsustainably use the natural environment, hence dissolving the 
simplistic division between North and South. This is seen played out by the strong 
emphasis on demand side issues of energy quantity as well as the supply side quality 
of environmentally sound technologies in general climate change discourse. One of 
the major opposition arguments to Malthusian reasoning, explicit in Hartman‟s 
helpful proposition, is that it is inherently and dangerously depoliticizing. 
Discussions drawn from Metha and Millstone in a forthcoming book on “Scarcity” 
describe the economic, social and political constructions of scarcity that are all too 
often and simplistically blamed on the growth in human numbers.4,19,21 Malthusian 
framing of environmental problems has the tendency to overlook critical 
distributional factors of inequality and injustice. Additionally, there is distrust for the 
exaggeration of the efficacy of family planning services to bring down fertility levels, 
in place of vital and favorable broader contextual factors like improved poverty 





Numerous agendas are conflated into contemporary Malthusian arguments 
ranging from environmental claims, issues in women‟s health, socio-political 
arguments involving security and economics, as well as arguments from the far right. 
It is misleading however for Hartman to categorize them all as the latter. 
 
The difficulty is that a poignant issue at the micro level (with repercussions at 
meso and macro levels) is that high fertility is strongly associated with high maternal 
mortality, low female education, and poverty.9,22,23 Mirroring this observation in 
essence and message is the fact that no country bar the oil rich Arab states have risen 
from poverty while maintaining high rates of fertility.24 The message in this instance 
is not always necessarily on macro population growth trajectories. Embracing 
Malthusian arguments can provide politically catchy slogans to persuade senior 
policy makers to invest in sexual and reproductive health rights of women normally 
with no access (on a human rights basis). Such a strategy confers with analysis of 
policy processes, which argues that complex issues are often simplified to tell and sell 
a story to donors and wider audiences.15 Important for this issue are the dangers that 
instrumentalist approaches present for uncertain and indirect knock-on effects at a 
later time. Eyben and colleagues discuss the instrumentalist strategies employed at 
policy level to juggle different meanings for women‟s empowerment, “strategically 
exploiting the concept‟s polysemic nature to keep that agenda alive.”25 Indeed, in this 
spirit, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, chairperson of the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues comments that undertaking centralized ways of controlling 
population growth for the sake of climate change would result “in an even greater 
mess.”3 Policy processes rarely represent the views of all stakeholders and are likely 
to exclude those of either the poor or marginalized.15 Thus, there is an apparent 
danger in mainstreaming the population-climate rationale, not least because it will 
focus policy impacts on those already poor and marginalized but is simultaneously 
less likely include them in process. 
 
PAI and Satterthwaite harbor different beliefs in light of their occupational 
interests. These translate into scientific assertions that are selectively compiled to act 
as the vehicle for their idea of what appropriate policy should look like. PAI have a 
concern for shortfalls in family planning resources, while Satterthwaite is interested 
in the debilitating levels of inequality in energy consumption.1,5 
 
I reject Bloor‟s (1976) assertion that sociologists of science should be neutral 
and impartial to truth-value claims.26 Instead it may be useful to identify where the 
sociologists engaged in deconstructive processes can become meaningful 
contributors to the scientific discourse by exposing and advancing issues that the 
scientists themselves are unwilling to or unable to acknowledge. Jasanoff‟s (1990) 
model of science-informed policy construction, deconstruction and reconstruction 
makes this point.27 After the deconstructive process through cross examination and 
SSK methods, policy makers are able to rebuild or reconstruct the policy 
implications with a broader understanding of both the scientific and non-scientific 
inputs. Through unwrapping some of the deliberate methodological approaches, 
framing assumptions, and political agendas, driving the controversy between 
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Satterthwaite and PAI,1,5 a clearing appears through which progress in advancing the 




This paper suffers from a lack of directly comparable processes of upstream 
scientific knowledge production. Interestingly none of the actors used in this analysis 
fits neatly into one or other class of knowledge producer or knowledge user, which 
to an extent confuses the categories of upstream and downstream science and the 
notion of blurred boundaries between science and polic.27 An integrated sociological 
approach which examines the important “framing assumptions” that shape the ways 
that science is constructed and conducted upstream and reproduced and 
appropriated downstream in policy debates can helpfully “deconstruct” and expose 
non-scientific or normative assumptions.28 
 
There is a danger that certain simplistic meta-narratives could come to 
dominate macro policy discourse. In the case of population and climate change the 
risk would be jeopardizing more than two decades of campaigns and advocacy 
ensuring that reproductive health services, in particular family planning are high 
quality, culturally appropriate and driven by human rights justifications. Conversely, 
however, climate change is caused by a complex interaction of dynamic, long term 
and varied factors. Therefore, it would seem foolish to entirely disregard the 
importance of demographic trajectories over the next 90 years. It is not contested 
that climate policy will necessarily be multifarious, but at the same time the necessity 
of visibly communicating a cause risks emphasizing the issue to the point of eclipsing 
all else. This paper seeks to lift the veil or scientific certainty from the debate, and 
urges those that engage in it to recognize the equal presence of politics, nuance and 
complexity in the story.  For actors at high policy levels facing numerous competing 
priorities to do so is likely extremely difficult and uncertain.  Every effort should be 
made to normalize realist constructivist views presented in this paper so that they 
may also appear with the frequency that simplified policy narratives do. 
 
Through different strategies and to different degrees scientific knowledge 
produced both upstream and downstream is a hybrid of scientific and non-scientific 
solutions, each framed according to particular narratives or problem setting. Thus, in 
as much as the population-climate argument subscribes to a dominant narrative 
premised on Malthusian principles, that which Satterthwaite advances provides a 
valuable counter-narrative, which exposes issues that the narrative risks silencing.5 
Debate is necessary, but to prevent a sustained controversy, so is its deconstruction. 
Indeed it does seem that, particularly downstream the normative values are so 
pronounced, there is little scope for reconciling either side pedaling the controversy. 
This essay argues that the capacity for such reconciliation lies amongst the best 
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